State of Utah v. Antonio G. Bosco : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Antonio G. Bosco : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William H. Heigh; Attorney for Appellee.
Brett J. Delporto; Mark L. Shurtleff; Scott Garrnett; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bosco, No. 20050329 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5744
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ANTONIO G. BOSCO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050329-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT DISMISSING A CHARGE OF BURGLARY, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (WEST 2004), IN THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE G. 
MICHAEL WESTFALL PRESIDING 
WILLIAM H.LEIGH 
36 North 300 West 
PO Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0270 
Attorney for defendant/appellee 
BRETT J. DELPORTO (6862) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SCOTT GARRETT 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorneys for plaintiff/appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 1 8 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ANTONIO G. BOSCO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20050329-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT DISMISSING A CHARGE OF BURGLARY, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (WEST 2004), IN THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE G. 
MICHAEL WESTFALL PRESIDING 
WILLIAM H. LEIGH 
36 North 300 West 
PO Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0270 
BRETT J. DELPORTO (6862) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SCOTT GARRETT 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorney for defendant/appellee Attorneys for plaintiff/appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO BIND DEFENDANT OVER 
FOR TRIAL ON BURGLARY BECAUSE IT WAS REASONABLE TO INFER 
FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT HE BROKE INTO HIS EX-WIFE'S TRAILER 
INTENDING TO COMMIT THEFT 6 
CONCLUSION 12 
NO ADDENDA NECESSARY 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Senigal, 74 Fed. Appx. 407 (5th Cir. 2003) 10 
STATE CASES 
Archie v. State, 224 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. App. 1976) 9 
People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228 (Cal. 2005) 9 
People v. Millwee, 954 P.2d 990 (Cal.1998) 9 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300 2, 7, 8, 11 
State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961) 9 
State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) 8, 11 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998) 8 
State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981) 9 
State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998) 7,11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004) 1, 2, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) .passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintiftfAppellant, Case No. 20050329-CA 
v. 
ANTONIO G. BOSCO, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals a dismissal of one count of burglary of a dwelling, a second 
degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Michael Westfall 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in declining to bind defendant over on burglary 
after determining that the intent to commit theft could not be inferred from evidence 
showing that defendant needed money, had asked his wife to give him some, and then had 
broken into her trailer after she refused? 
Standard of Review: "The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant 
over for trial is a question of law" reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes relevant to this appeal include Utah's burglary statute: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004); and Utah's theft statute: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information on March 22, 2005, with one count of 
burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony. R. 3. 
A preliminary hearing was held on March 23, 2005. R. 21. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the trial court declined to bind defendant over for trial and dismissed the 
information. R. 20, 26-27. 
On March 31, 2005, the State filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No one, not even defendant himself, disputed that he had broken into his ex-wife's 
trailer on March 8, 2005. See R. 6, 25, 31, 32. 
As Kayleen Irwin, a neighbor, recalled, "[T]here was a gentleman standing on her 
porch fiddling with her window, and then as my husband was walking out to the car to go 
back to work he started breaking the window with his hand. I stayed there long enough to 
see my husband off, but because he had stopped and turned to look at my husband and 
myself, I got nervous and went back in the house, but I did see him entering into the front 
window." R. 32:6. 
Mike Blake, a Cedar City police detective, arrived at the scene and observed 
defendant's van parked in the driveway of the trailer, which belonged to April Bosco, 
defendant's ex-wife. R. 32:23. Soon, defendant emerged, got into his van and drove off. 
Id. Police officers stopped him a short distance away. R. 32:24. 
Det. Blake approached defendant's side of the vehicle and immediately noticed 
that defendant's hand was bleeding. Id After advising defendant of his rights, Det. 
Blake asked him why he had broken into the trailer. R. 32:24:25. 
"[0]riginally, Mr. Bosco said, 'It's my house. I was breaking into my own 
house.'" R. 32:25. But when Det. Blake pressed defendant, he admitted it was his ex-
wife's trailer. Id. "At that point he stated that he and his ex-wife had recently broken up, 
that he was going back to the residence to pick up his property because he was moving 
out after the recent split He said that he had called earlier in the morning and that he 
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had made arrangements with his wife to come over to the house and to retrieve his 
property, that he was—that he had still remaining in the house, that when he got to the 
house that she was not there. Id. 
Defendant denied intentionally breaking the window. Id. "He told us that as he 
walked by the front window it shattered," perhaps because "he may have brushed it with 
his sleeve.5' Id. 
Mrs. Bosco told Det. Blake that defendant had called her earlier, but only to ask 
for money, which he claimed he needed to purchase medicine for health problems. R. 
32:27. She declined to give him any money because he owed her money for child 
support. Id. She said she and defendant had been divorced for two years and that 
defendant had never lived at the trailer. Id. She stated that defendant had not told her he 
would be coming to her home and that she had not invited him. R. 32:28. Further, she 
stated that it was not "okay" for defendant to break her window and enter her home 
because he had no right to be there. R. 32:32. Finally, she told Det. Blake that there 
appeared to be nothing missing from the trailer, but that a TV stand had been moved and 
looked like it had been gone through, and that there was some evidence that other things 
had been "shuffled around" in the trailer. Id. 
Det. Blake also recovered several voice messages from defendant left on Mrs. 
Bosco's answering machine. Before breaking into the trailer, defendant left three 
messages asking whether she was home or not. R. 32:28. In a later message recorded 
after the break-in, defendant said: "I have a little problem. I came to see you. I leaned on 
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your window and I broke it. The cops came over and I told them that it was okay. Please 
back me up on this so I don't go to jail. Cover for me on this one, April. You hear me?" 
R. 32:31. In a final message, defendant said: "April, I broke into your house, but I had a 
seizure, and I don't remember what happened." Id 
At defendant's preliminary hearing, Mrs. Bosco was reticent about providing 
information that might be damaging to defendant. She said defendant had told her "that 
he had the right to be over at my property. If I say he doesn't then they'll throw him in 
jail. So I told him I don't want to press charges . . ." R: 32:15. 
She denied that defendant had called her before the break-in and asked for money. 
R. 32:16. She also testified that defendant informed her that he was coming over to her 
house that day and that he had permission to be there. R. 32:19-20. "I don't have any 
problem with him going in my house because I know he's not going to steal anything." Id. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court refused to bind defendant over for 
trial on the burglary charge because the judge did not believe that the evidence supported 
a rational inference that he intended to commit theft while he was in the trailer. R. 32:41. 
The judge stated: 
I've heard some testimony that there was a request by the defendant 
earlier in the day to obtain money from the resident there, and I'm being 
asked to essentially from that conclude that there is a reasonable 
inference that when Mr. Bosco entered the residence unlawfully he did 
so with the intent to commit a theft, and I just have a problem making 
that leap. Granted, that inference could be drawn, but I have to 
determine whether that's a reasonable inference to be drawn under the 
circumstances, and I'm just not prepared to go that far. 
Id 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not binding defendant over for trial because there was 
sufficient evidence to support a rational inference that he broke into his ex-wife's trailer 
intending to commit theft. The evidence presented at defendant's preliminary hearing 
showed conclusively that defendant broke into the trailer; even defendant admitted it. His 
intent to commit theft may be rationally inferred from that totality of the circumstances, 
including the break-in itself, evidence that defendant's ex-wife refused his request for 
money prior to the break-in; and evidence that that some cabinets and other items in the 
trailer had been moved and apparently rummaged through while the owner was out. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO BIND 
DEFENDANT OVER FOR TRIAL ON BURGLARY BECAUSE 
IT WAS REASONABLE TO INFER FROM THE EVIDENCE 
THAT HE BROKE INTO HIS EX-WIFE'S TRAILER 
INTENDING TO COMMIT THEFT. 
The trial court erred in declining to bind defendant over for trial on charges of 
burglary of a dwelling because the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable 
inference that he broke into the trailer with the intent to commit theft. Accordingly, the 
trial court's ruling must be reversed. 
The trial court declined to bind over because it found that even though defendant 
unlawfully broke into his wife's trailer after she denied his request for money, there were 
still no rational inferences to show defendant entered the trailer intending to commit theft. 
R. 32:41. The judge stated: 
Fve heard some testimony that there was a request by the defendant 
earlier in the day to obtain money from the resident there, and I'm being 
asked to essentially from that conclude that there is a reasonable 
inference that when Mr. Bosco entered the residence unlawfully he did 
so with the intent to commit a theft, and I just have a problem making 
that leap. Granted, that inference could be drawn, but I have to 
determine whether that's a reasonable inference to be drawn under the 
circumstances, and I'm just not prepared to go that far. 
Id. As demonstrated below, this ruling is erroneous and should be reversed. 
Bindover standard. The trial court should be reversed because it misapplied the 
bindover standard. In Clark, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the bindover standard, 
concluding that at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution need only present "sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it." 2001 UT 9, \ 16, 20 P.3d 300. The court equated this standard 
to "the arrest warrant probable cause standard," and noted that "the quantum of evidence 
necessary to support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict 
motion." Id. In determining whether evidence at a preliminary hearing is sufficient to 
support a bindover, a magistrate must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution. A/, at ^ f 10. The magistrate "is precluded from 
evaluating the weight of otherwise credible evidence." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 
(Utah 1998). Rather, "the magistrate's evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is 
limited to determining that 'evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). "When faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh 
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the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
f 10 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159^7, 3 P.3d 725). 
Burglary. In Utah, the elements of burglary of a dwelling are: (1) entering or 
remaining unlawfully in a building or any portion thereof; and (2) an intent to commit 
theft or any other felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )(b) (West 2004) (emphasis 
added). Thus, burglary need not involve actual theft; rather burglary may be committed 
by entering or remaining unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit theft. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[b]urglarious intent 'is a mental state of 
the actor. [T]he trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based upon [an] 
examination of the surrounding circumstances to reasonably infer its existence.'" State v. 
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (citing Farno v. State, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 
(1974)). In Porter, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for 
burglary of a dwelling, even though there was no evidence that Porter had taken anything 
from the apartment he had broken into. 705 P.2d at 1176. Porter was arrested after the 
manager observed defendant picking the lock on the door to the apartment. Id. Arresting 
officers discovered that Porter had burglary tools, a loaded pistol and about twenty-one 
dollars in dimes. Id. Later that day, the manager discovered someone had apparently 
broken into the laundry room and stolen change from a coin box, which had been 
dislodged and was empty. He testified that the coin box usually contained between 
twenty and thirty dollars when serviced. Id. 
After retiring for deliberation, jurors apparently had no difficulty finding that 
Porter had unlawfully entered the apartment. But they struggled with the question of his 
intent. Id. at 1177. Jurors sent a note to the judge asking whether an instruction stating 
that intent may be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances meant that 
jurors could consider only defendant's actions while in the apartment or whether they 
could also consider "previous events, what the person may have done in the 
laundryroom?" Id. The judge responded in writing, stating: "You may consider all 
conduct of the defendant on the premises on February 22, 1984." Id. 
After his conviction, Porter challenged the judge's additional instruction, claiming 
it was an improper comment on the evidence. Id. at 1177. The Supreme Court disagreed: 
"Where the breaking and entering are clearly established and not controverted, the intent 
to steal may be sufficiently established by inference fairly deducible from all the 
circumstances and need not be established by direct proof." Id.; see also State v. 
Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981) (where defendant breaks and enters a building 
unlawfully at night without consent, inference may be drawn of intent to commit theft); 
State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961) (same). 
The intent-to-commit-theft element of a burglary charge, as with other crimes, may 
be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's need for 
money. See, e.gy People v. Horning, 102 P.3d 228, 250 (Cal. 2005) (defendant's stated 
need for money supported inference that he had intent to steal); People v. Millwee, 954 
P.2d 990,1012 (Cal. 1998) (same); Archie v. State, 224 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ga. App. 1976) 
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(defendant's statement that he needed money to buy drugs supported intent element of 
theft conviction); cf. United States v. Senigal, 74 Fed. Appx. 407 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(defendant's need for money for business supported intent element of fraud). 
Here, defendant's intent to steal is reasonably inferable from his request for money 
from his wife, his subsequent unlawful entry into the trailer and evidence that he had 
rummaged through a TV stand and moved other items while he was inside. Like Porter, 
defendant's unlawful entry into the trailer was not at issue. Ms. Irwin testified that she 
witnessed defendant break the window and climb through the opening into the trailer. R. 
32:6. Additionally, defendant admitted to arresting officers thait he had broken into the 
trailer, R. 32:32,* and Ms. Bosco, his ex-wife, stated that defendant had never lived in the 
trailer and was not authorized to be there. See R. 32:27-28. 
There was also more than adequate probable cause to support a reasonable 
inference that petitioner intended to commit theft. First, although unlawful entry alone 
may not support intent to commit theft, State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986), it is 
difficult to imagine what other reason he maty have had to break into the trailer. Although 
he claimed his intent was to retrieve items that belonged to him after his divorce, 
defendant's divorce had become final more than two years earlier and he had never lived 
at the trailer. There was also evidence that he had no permission to enter the trailer. R. 
32:27-28. Second, defendant's intent to steed could be inferred from his stated need for 
money as evidenced by his request that Ms. Bosco give him money to purchase medicine. 
1
 He claimed, however, that he only did it because he was having a seizure and 
"couldn't be held accountable for his actions . . ." R. 32:34. 
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R. 32:27. Like Porter, defendant apparently did not actually steal anything from the 
trailer. Porter, 705 P.2d at 1177. However, defendant's intent, like that of Porter, was 
"fairly deducible" from the totality of the circumstances. Id. "The jury was at liberty to 
infer from the fact that [Porter] had entered the laundry room to commit a theft, that such 
may have been his intent when he entered [the] apartment..." Id. Similarly, defendant's 
intent to commit theft was inferable from that fact that after his ex-wife refused to give 
him money, he broke into her home and may have rummaged through a TV stand and 
moved other items in the trailer, R. 32:32, presumably in search of money. 
At the preliminary hearing stage, all that is required is a reasonable inference that 
defendant broke into the trailer with the intent to commit theft. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 
10 (at preliminary hearing, court must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to prosecution). The evidence of defendant's intent is not "'wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim.'" Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438 (citation omitted). Here, when faced 
with conflicting evidence, the trial judge did precisely what is forbidden: He "sift[ed] and 
weigh[ed] the evidence," overlooking the mandates of this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court requiring that "those tasks [must be left] to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 
9, f 10. Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to bind defendant over for trial on 
burglary of a dwelling. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court and remand 
with instructions that defendant be bound over for trial. 
DATED this \ y'flay of July, 2005. 
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Utah Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
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